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Duquesne Law Review
Volume 30, Fall 1991, Number 1
The Appropriate Judicial Response to Evidence of
the Violation of a Criminal Statute
in a Negligence Action
David E. Seidelson*
Strange things happen when a court hearing a negligence action
is confronted with evidence of violation of a criminal statute. Fre-
quently, the court blurs the distinction between a purely common
law negligence action and one predicated on such a statutory viola-
tion. Almost certainly the court will recognize that, assuming its
applicability, the statute supplants the reasonable person standard
as the criterion by which the defendant's conduct is to be judged.
But beyond this point the court may generate an awkward amal-
gam of legislative intent and common law concepts in resolving
such matters as factual cause and effect," proximate cause,2 and
contributory negligence.3 Perhaps such confusion is a predictable
consequence of a court's determination that a criminal statute not
explicitly creating any private cause of action may nevertheless
serve as the basis for recovery in a negligence action. Given this
basic (and, I believe, entirely appropriate) determination,- the
court must, to some extent, accommodate both the legislative in-
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.
1. See text at note 18.
2. See text at note 10.
3. See text at note 64.
4. There are, I believe, two basic justifications for permitting an applicable criminal
statute to serve as the basis for recovery in a negligence action. First, such use does not
impose upon the defendant any new burden of conduct since the defendant was under a
pre-existing obligation to comply with the criminal statute. Second, because the defendant
was required to comply, the plaintiff had a right to rely on such compliance. Applying the
criminal statute in the negligence action vindicates the plaintiff's reliance.
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tention underlying the criminal statute and judicial concepts of a
legally sufficient case. In striking this accommodation the court
often goes awry, and usually in the direction of diminishing the
significance of legislative intent and enhancing common law princi-
ples. The court's apparent confusion is by no means a recent phe-
nomenon. It was manifested in one of the earliest and best known
negligence cases in which recovery was predicated on the defend-
ant's violation of a criminal statute.
In Osborne v McMasters,5 plaintiff brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against defendant, the proprietor of a drug store, alleging that,
because of the failure of defendant's clerk to affix a poison label to
a product sold to plaintiff's intestate, she ingested the material,
unaware of its toxicity. The failure to affix a poison label to the
product violated a criminal statute.6 In affirming judgment for the
plaintiff, the court wrote:
The present is a common-law action, the gist of which is defendant's negli-
gence, resulting in the death of plaintiff's intestate. Negligence is the breach
of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the duty is one imposed by the rule
of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to injure another,
or is imposed by a statute designed for the protection of others. The only
difference is that in the one case the measure of legal duty is to be deter-
mined upon common-law principles, while in the other the statute fixes it,
so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negli-
gence, or, in other words, negligence per se.7
The court stated that
[t]he action in the latter case is not a statutory one, nor does the statute
give the right of action in any other sense, except that it makes an act negli-
gent which otherwise might not be such, or at least only evidence of
negligence."
I have no quarrel with the conclusion achieved by the court, its
affirmance of the judgment for plaintiff, or with much of the above
quoted language. Indeed, much of the language is notable for its
precision and even elegance in a late-nineteenth century manner.
But portions of that language do disturb me. I think it is not
5. 40 Minn 103, 41 NW 543 (1889).
6. Osborne, 41 NW at 543. It is immaterial for present purposes whether section 329
of the Penal Code or section 14, c. 147, Laws 1885, or both, are still in force, and constitute
the law governing this case. The requirements of both statutes are substantially the same,
and the sole object of both is to protect the public against the dangerous qualities of poison.
Id.
7. Osborne, 41 NW at 543-44.
8. Id at 544.
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accurate to assert that "[tihe only difference"9 between a negli-
gence action predicated on violation of a criminal statute and an
action based on common law negligence is that, in the former case,
the statute defines the standard of care. It does this, of course; but
it does a great deal more. In such an action, I believe that the
criminal statute, once deemed applicable by the court, determines
not only the standard of care but also those to whom the duty to
act in that manner is owed, the perils to be avoided by compliance
with the duty, and that the statutory violation was a proximate
cause of the victim's injury. Paradoxically, the court, earlier on in
its opinion, wrote:
[W]here a statute ... imposes upon any person a specific duty for the pro-
tection or benefit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty, he is liable
to those for whose protection or benefit it was imposed for any injuries of
the character which the statute . . .was designed to prevent, and which
were proximately caused by such neglect.10
This language implies, consistently with my own view, that the
statute determines the class of persons intended to be protected
and the perils from which they are intended to be protected. Si-
multaneously, however, the language suggests that, even if the vic-
tim was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the
statute and even if the peril that occasioned the victim's injury was
one the statute was intended to protect against, there remains the
additional question of whether the defendant's violation was a
proximate cause of the victim's injury. This, I think, cannot be
correct.
The last quoted excerpt indicates that, in determining the appli-
cability of a criminal statute to a particular negligence action, the
court must decide whether (1) the victim was within the class in-
tended to be protected by the statute, (2) the peril that occasioned
the injury was one from which the statute was intended to protect,
and (3) the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the vic-
tim's injury. The first two requirements are, I think, entirely ap-
propriate. The third requirement, however, strikes me as being su-
perfluous and, worse yet, potentially confusing. To put it another
way, I believe that if the court asks and answers the first two ques-
tions intelligently, the proximate cause issue will necessarily be re-
solved. To require the third question to be answered indepen-
dently may be to send the court on a fool's errand. As is often the
9. Id.
10. Id at 543.
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case with such a chore, the results may be more harmful than
helpful.
Why do I say this? Let's consider a negligence action not involv-
ing any statutory violation. In order to make a legally sufficient
case, the plaintiff must present evidence indicating (1) negligence
attributable to the defendant, (2) a legally cognizable injury sus-
tained by the plaintiff, (3) a factual cause and effect relationship
between that negligence and such injury, and (4) that the negli-
gence was a proximate cause of the injury.11 In determining the
legal sufficiency of the proximate cause issue, the court, whatever
verbalization it may employ, is likely to resolve the following ques-
tions: (1) could a reasonable jury find that defendant's negligence
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury of any kind to this
victim? And (2) could a reasonable jury find that the manner of
injury that occurred was within the general manner of injury rea-
sonably foreseeable as a result of defendant's negligence? 2 If both
of these questions- are resolved affirmatively, the proximate cause
issue will be deemed legally sufficient.
There is an obvious and striking similarity between these two
proximate cause questions and the first two questions suggested by
Osborne for determining the applicability of a criminal statute to a
particular negligence action. Each set contains a "who" and a
"what" question. In the negligence action not involving a statutory
violation, the two questions must be asked and answered from the
perspective of a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances.
After all, what is being resolved in the proximate cause issue is
whether injury of any kind to this victim was reasonably foresee-
able as a result of defendant's negligence and whether the manner
of injury was within the general manner of injury reasonably fore-
seeable as a result of defendant's negligence. In the negligence ac-
tion involving a criminal statute, the two questions must be asked
and answered from the perspective of the legislature that enacted
the statute. After all, what is being resolved is whether the victim
was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the
statute and whether the peril that occasioned the victim's injury
was one intended to be protected from by the statute. Notwith-
standing this difference in perspective, the two sets of questions
are aimed at resolving similar issues: who was within the
11. See David E. Seidelson, Some Reflections on Proximate Cause, 19 Duquesne L
Rev 1, 2 (1980).
12. Seidelson, 19 Duquesne L Rev at 4-5, 16-18 (cited in note 11).
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threatened or protected class of persons and from what general
manner of injury or peril were these persons intended to be pro-
tected? Since the questions in the negligence action not involving a
statutory violation are aimed at resolving the proximate cause is-
sue, the similar questions in the action involving a statutory viola-
tion must necessarily resolve the proximate cause issue. Therefore,
in the latter situation, if the court determines that the victim was
within the class intended to be protected by the criminal statute
and that the peril that occasioned the victim's injury was one in-
tended to be protected from by the statute, and assuming a factual
cause and effect relationship between violation and injury, separate
judicial consideration of the proximate cause issue would be
superfluous.
Consequently, I believe that a court hearing a negligence action
and compelled to determine the applicability of a criminal statute
should ask the following questions: (1) Was the victim within the
class of persons intended to be protected by the statute? (2) Was
the peril that occasioned the victim's injury one from which the
statute was intended to protect? (3) Was there a factual cause and
effect relationship between the violation and the injury? If these
three questions are answered affirmatively, the criminal statute
should be deemed applicable.
Indeed, if the court asks and answers these three questions intel-
ligently and affirmatively, the court will have determined affirma-
tively the existence of each of the legally essential elements of a
negligence action: negligence attributable to the defendant, a le-
gally cognizable injury sustained by the victim, a factual cause and
effect relationship between negligence and injury, and proximate
cause. With regard to negligence, "the statute fixes""' the duty to
be imposed on the defendant. Thus, evidence of defendant's viola-
tion of the statute demonstrates negligence. Evidence that the
peril that occasioned the victim's injury was one intended to be
protected against by the statute indicates that the injury is legally
cognizable. Evidence of a factual cause and effect relationship be-
tween statutory violation and injury of course satisfies the third
element. As for proximate cause, we have already seen that affirm-
ative answers to the first two questions, the "who" and the "what"
inquiries, demonstrate proximate cause. Consequently, when the
court asks and answers the three critical questions for determining
the applicability of the criminal statute to the negligence action
13. Osborne, 41 NW at 544.
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before the court, it will have determined legal sufficiency as to each
requisite element of the action.
Moreover, in asking and answering those three critical questions,
the court will be performing a judicial function, determining legis-
lative intent.14 Whom the legislature meant to protect, and from
what perils the legislature intended to afford protection, are mat-
ters of legislative intent, an area typically reserved for the court.15
Similarly, I believe that in resolving the factual cause and effect
relationship between statutory violation and injury, the court, to a
large extent, will be determining legislative intent. The kind and
nature of the factual nexus between violation and injury necessary
to impose liability predicated on the statute seem to be intimately
related to legislative intent. 6 Therefore, the court's answers to the
three questions are not properly subject to jury reconsideration, at
least not beyond that made necessary by the court's conclusion
with regard to factual cause and effect.17 Indeed, to permit the jury
to reconsider those questions would be an abdication of judicial
responsibility.
This does not mean, of course, that the jury has no role to play
14. E. J. Kionka, Torts in a Nutshell, Injuries to Persons and Property 72-73 (West
1977).
When is the statute a relevant standard? The fundamental limitation is legislative
purpose. The court must first find that the statute was intended, at least in part, to
protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff (or defendant, as the case may
be) against the particular hazard and kind of harm which resulted.. . . If the legisla-
ture's standard is to be adopted, then the court must also adopt the limits of the
purpose for which the statute was intended, for those are presumably the limits of its
validity.. . . Legislative purpose is, of course, whatever the courts say it is, and their
predilections vary.
Id.
Courts routinely use [criminal statutes] in negligence cases as evidence of, or as
establishing, the standard of care which D was required to meet, provided the court
finds the appropriate legislative purpose.
E. J. Kionka, Torts, Black Letter Series 141 (West 1988).
15. C.B. Nutting & S.D. Elliott, Cases and Materials on Legislation 244 (West 2d ed
1955).
The avowed purpose of statutory interpretation is to reach a result consonant with
"legislative intention." But most situations present questions of genuine doubt as to
what the legislature may have intended. Frequently, too, it is obvious that the no-
nomniscient legislature did not specifically anticipate, nor provide for, the situation
that subsequently arose.
The court cannot call on the legislature for an advisory opinion as to what it meant.
The court must decide for itself what the legislature must have meant, or would have
meant had it been confronted with the issue presented for judicial decision.
Nutting & Elliott, Cases and Materials on Legislation at 244 (cited within this note).
16.. See text at note 18.
17. Id.
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in such an action. When the court asks and answers the three
questions, it must do so accepting as true the plaintiff's evidence,
as the jury may. But the jury may not accept the plaintiff's evi-
dence. For example, the jury may not accept the evidence of the
plaintiff placing the victim within the class intended to be pro-
tected by the statute, or the evidence demonstrating that the peril
that occasioned the victim's injury was one intended to be pro-
tected against by the statute, or the evidence indicating that the
factual cause and effect relationship deemed necessary by the
court existed, or the evidence offered to prove that defendant vio-
lated the statute. These matters rest quite properly within the
province of the jury, properly instructed by the court. The legisla-
tive intent underlying the criminal statute, however, is for judicial
determination exclusively.
How does all of this apply to Osborne? Let's assume that plain-
tiff presents evidence that Mrs. Osborne purchased the product
from defendant and subsequently ingested it, unaware of its toxic
quality. Plaintiff also presents evidence that defendant's clerk
failed to affix a poison label to the product and that such a label
would have informed Mrs. Osborne of its toxic quality. Then plain-
tiff offers in evidence the criminal statute making it unlawful to
sell such a product without affixing a poison label thereto. In de-
termining whether the statute is applicable to this negligence ac-
tion, the court should ask and answer three questions: was Mrs.
Osborne within the class intended to be protected by the statute?
Was the peril that occasioned her death one from which the stat-
ute was intended to protect? Was there a factual cause and effect
relationship between the statutory violation and Mrs. Osborne's
death-producing injury?
Because Mrs. Osborne purchased and ingested the product una-
ware of its toxic quality, she certainly would have been within the
class intended to be protected by the statute. Because her death
was occasioned by her ingestion of the product, unaware of its
toxic quality, the peril that occasioned her death was certainly one
intended to be protected against by the statute. Moreover, plain-
tiff's evidence that a poison label affixed to the product as required
by the statute would have informed Mrs. Osborne of the toxic
quality demonstrates a factual cause and effect relationship be-
tween statutory violation and injury. Once the court answers these
three questions affirmatively, there is no remaining proximate
cause issue. The affirmative answers to these questions compel an
affirmative finding as to proximate cause. Moreover, these affirma-
1991
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tive answers compel the conclusion that plaintiff's case is legally
sufficient with regard to each of the requisite elements. Conse-
quently, plaintiff would be entitled to a jury instruction to the ef-
fect that, if the jury accepts the plaintiff's evidence, it must find
for the plaintiff.
This does not mean, of course, that the defendant is precluded
from presenting controverting evidence or that the jury may not
accept that controverting evidence. For example, the defendant
could present evidence that, at all relevant times, Mrs. Osborne
had been aware of the toxic quality of the product. The court, una-
ble to determine whether the jury will accept plaintiff's or defend-
ant's evidence, must instruct the jury accordingly. We have already
concluded that, if the jury accepts the plaintiff's evidence, it must
find for the plaintiff. But suppose the jury accepts the defendant's
evidence. How would that affect the applicability of the statute to
this case?
If Mrs. Osborne had been aware of the toxic quality of the prod-
uct at all relevant times, even absent a poison label affixed thereto,
she would not have been a member of the class intended to be
protected by the statute. This would compel the conclusion that
the statute was not applicable to this case since, if any of the three
critical questions is answered negatively, the statute is inapplica-
ble. Moreover, if Mrs. Osborne had been aware of the toxic quality,
the peril that occasioned her death, knowing ingestion of the
poison, would not have been one of the perils intended to be pro-
tected against by the statute. Therefore, the second question, too,
would require a negative answer. In addition, assuming Mrs. Os-
borne's knowledge of the toxic quality, there would have been no
factual cause and effect relationship between statutory violation
and injury. Thus the third question would require a negative an-
swer. It becomes obvious that, if the jury accepts defendant's evi-
dence, the jury should be instructed to disregard the criminal stat-
ute. Moreover, if plaintiff's evidence fails to generate any
alternative theory of liability, the jury should be instructed that, if
it accepts defendant's evidence, the jury should find for the de-
fendant. This conclusion, like the earlier one instructing the jury to
find for the plaintiff if it accepts the plaintiff's evidence, requires
no separate consideration of proximate cause.
Let's fashion a whollyhypothetical spin-off of Osborne. Let's as-
sume that plaintiff presents evidence that Mrs. Osborne, unaware
of its toxic quality, purchased the product from defendant and
subsequently placed the product on the kitchen table. Sometime
Vol. 30:1
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thereafter, her three-year-old daughter took the product from the
kitchen table, ingested its contents and died. Mrs. Osborne testifies
that, had she been aware of its toxic quality, she would not have
left the product in a position where it was readily accessible to her
daughter. Plaintiff presents evidence that defendant's clerk failed
to affix a poison label to the product and that such an affixed label
would have informed Mrs. Osborne of the toxic quality. Plaintiff
then offers the criminal statute into evidence. Once again, to deter-
mine the applicability of the statute to this action, the court must
answer the three questions. Was the illiterate child within the class
intended to be protected by the statute? I think the answer must
be yes. Although the child could not read and therefore would have
been uninformed by the label, the label would have informed the
mother who, thus informed, would not have left the product in a
place readily accessible to the child. Was the peril that occasioned
the child's death one from which the statute was intended to pro-
tect? Again, I think the answer must be yes. The peril that occa-
sioned the death was the accessibility of the toxic product to the
child, an accessibility resulting from the mother's ignorance of its
toxic quality. That ignorance was intended to be eliminated by the
statute. Was there a factual cause and effect relationship between
statutory violation and injury? Plaintiff's evidence indicates an af-
firmative answer. Had the poison label been affixed, Mrs. Osborne
would have been informed of the toxic quality and would not have
permitted the product to be readily accessible to her daughter. Be-
cause all three questions have been answered affirmatively, the
statute is applicable to the case. Once this determination is made
based on the evidence presented by the plaintiff, there is no re-
maining proximate cause issue to be resolved. Plaintiff would be
entitled to a jury instruction to the effect that, if the jury accepts
the plaintiff's evidence, the jury must find for the plaintiff.
Again, this does not mean that the defendant is precluded from
presenting controverting evidence or that the jury may not accept
such controverting evidence. For example, the defendant could
present evidence that, at all relevant times, Mrs. Osborne had been
aware of the toxic quality of the product. The court, unable to de-
termine whether the jury will accept plaintiff's or defendant's evi-
dence, must instruct the jury accordingly. We have already con-
cluded that, if the jury accepts the plaintiff's evidence, the jury
must find for the plaintiff. But suppose the jury accepts the de-
fendant's evidence. How should this affect the applicability of the
statute to this case?
1991
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If Mrs. Osborne had been aware of the toxic quality of the prod-
uct even absent a poison label affixed thereto, her three-year-old
daughter would not have been within the class intended to be pro-
tected by the statute. The illiterate child's statutory right to be
protected from her mother's ignorance would not have been impli-
cated. This would compel the conclusion that the statute is not
applicable to this case because, if any of the three questions is an-
swered negatively, the statute is inapplicable. Once again, however,
let's consider the other two questions for the sake of completeness.
If Mrs. Osborne had been aware of the product's toxic quality, the
peril that occasioned the child's death would not have been one
intended to be protected against by the statute. It would have been
the mother's informed conduct in leaving the product on the
kitchen table that generated the death-producing peril. Therefore,
the second question, too, would require a negative answer. More-
over, had Mrs. Osborne been aware of the toxic quality, there
would have been no factual cause and effect relationship between
the statutory violation and injury. All three questions would be an-
swered negatively. It becomes apparent that, if the jury accepts the
defendant's evidence, the jury should be instructed to disregard
the now inapplicable criminal statute. Moreover, if plaintiff's evi-
dence fails to generate any alternative theory of liability, the jury
should be instructed that, if it accepts defendant's evidence, the
jury must find for the defendant. And, once again, this conclusion,
like the earlier one instructing the jury to find for the plaintiff if it
accepts the plaintiff's evidence, requires no independent considera-
tion of proximate cause.
Let's take another hypothetical spin-off of Osborne. Mrs. Os-
borne, unaware of the toxic quality of the product purchased from
defendant, nevertheless places the product on the top shelf of the
bathroom medicine cabinet between the iodine and a bottle of rub-
bing alcohol. Sometime thereafter, her three-year-old daughter
climbs up on the toilet, from there to the sink, and then opens the
cabinet, ingests the product and dies. In the ensuing wrongful
death action, Mrs. Osborne testifies that defendant's clerk failed to
affix a poison label to the product and that, had such a label been
affixed, it would have informed Mrs. Osborne of the product's toxic
quality. Plaintiff then offers the criminal statute. Is it applicable to
this negligence action? I think not. In order for the illiterate victim
to have been within the class intended to be protected by the stat-
ute, she must have been placed in jeopardy by her mother's igno-
rance of the toxic quality. Here she was not. Despite Mrs. Os-
Vol. 30:1
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borne's ignorance of the toxic quality of the product, she placed it
between two other toxic products in a place not readily accessible
to the three-year-old. This would lead the court to conclude that
the statute was inapplicable. For the sake of completeness, how-
ever, let's consider the other two questions. Was the peril that oc-
casioned the victim's death one from which the statute was in-
tended to protect? Again, I think the answer is no. First, the
victim's ignorance of the toxic quality of the product she ingested
would not have been affected by a poison label, because the victim
was illiterate. Second, although Mrs. Osborne would have been in-
formed by a label, there is nothing to suggest that she would have
treated the product differently had she been informed. This latter
conclusion indicates as well that there was no factual cause and
effect relationship between the statutory violation and the victim's
death. Clearly, the statute is inapplicable to the case and, if plain-
tiff presents no alternative theory of liability, the court should
grant defendant's motion for directed verdict. And, once again, the
determination of the statute's inapplicability requires no separate
resolution of proximate cause.
Let's take one more spin-off of Osborne. Mrs. Osborne, unaware
of its toxic quality, purchases the product from defendant, whose
clerk fails to affix a poison label thereto. Mrs. Osborne places the
product on the top shelf of the bathroom medicine cabinet be-
tween the iodine and a bottle of rubbing alcohol. Subsequently,
Mr. Osborne awakes in the middle of the night with an acute at-
tack of indigestion. He enters the bathroom, turns on the light
and, mistaking the toxic product for an antacid, ingests the prod-
uct and dies. In the wrongful death action against defendant drug-
gist, plaintiff offers the criminal statute. In determining its appli-
cability, the court should ask and answer the three questions. Was
Mr. Osborne within the class intended to be protected by the stat-
ute? The answer must be yes. He was unaware of the toxic quality
of the product and was capable of being informed by the required
label. Was the peril that occasioned his death one the statute was
intended to protect against? Again, I think the answer is yes. The
death-producing peril was the unknowing ingestion of the poison.
A warning label could have informed the victim. Was there a fac-
tual cause and effect relationship between statutory violation and
death? 18
No explicit evidence was presented that, had a poison label been
18. See text at note 16.
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affixed, Mr. Osborne would have seen it before ingesting the toxic
product. Because Mr. Osborne is dead, no such explicit evidence
can be presented and no rational court would require it in such a
case. But this still leaves the court with something of a quandary.
There are at least three alternatives available to the court. First,
the court could conclude that defendant's violation of the statute
creates a conclusive presumption that the victim, capable of being
informed by the required label, would have been so informed. Sec-
ond, the court could conclude that defendant's violation of the
statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the victim, capable
of being informed by the required label, would have been so in-
formed. Third, the court could conclude that defendant's violation
of the statute and the evidence presented create a permissible in-
ference that the victim, capable of being informed by the required
label, would have been so informed. Whichever of these three al-
ternatives the court selects, plaintiff's case would be legally suffi-
cient with regard to a factual cause and effect relationship between
the statutory violation and the victim's death. But which alterna-
tive would be the most appropriate?
My own preference is for the first alternative: where the victim is
dead or otherwise unavailable to testify, so that explicit evidence
that the required label would have informed him cannot be
presented, defendant's violation of the criminal statute should re-
sult in a conclusive presumption that the victim, capable of being
informed, would have been informed by the statutorily required
label.19 I believe this choice most effectively fulfills the legislative
intent underlying the criminal statute. This intent, I believe, is to
assure the opportunity of informing those unaware of the toxic
quality of the product. Moreover, the fact that it is a criminal stat-
ute that was utilized to effectuate that intent suggests that the leg-
islature felt strongly about that purpose. If, in these circumstances,
the court opted for the conclusive presumption, those whose con-
duct is intended to be regulated by the statute would be most in-
fluenced to act in accordance with the statutory mandate. Since no
potential defendant could predict with certainty when the injured
victim would survive and be able to testify at trial or when the
victim would die or otherwise be unavailable to testify, the latter
19. Where the victim is alive and able to testify, I believe that the plaintiff should be
required to present sufficient evidence of a factual cause and effect relationship between the
statutory violation and the victim's injury. Compare, David E. Seidelson, Lack of Informed
Consent in Medical Malpractice and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting
Evidence, 14 Hofstra L Rev 621, 641 (1986).
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contingency triggering the conclusive presumption as to factual
cause and effect, potential defendants would have an additional
motive to comply with the criminal statute.20 Thus, the conclusive
presumption would most effectively further the strongly held legis-
lative intent. Should the court adopt this alternative, the appropri-
ate instruction to the jury would be, if it accepts the plaintiff's evi-
dence, it must find for the plaintiff.
If the court were to adopt the second alternative, a rebuttable
presumption, the jury instructions would depend upon whether or
not defendant presented evidence tending to rebut the presump-
tion of factual cause and effect. If no such evidence was presented,
the jury would be instructed that, if it accepts the plaintiff's evi-
dence, it must find for the plaintiff.21 If such rebutting evidence
was presented, the jury would be instructed to weigh the plaintiffs
evidence against the defendant's evidence in resolving the cause
and effect issue.22 Were the court to adopt the third alternative,
20. Compare, David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in
"Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions, 14 Duquesne L Rev 309, 342 (1976). There I suggested
that, if the patient was dead, plaintiff's usual burden of presenting evidence that defendant-
physician had failed to disclose to the patient the material risk that eventuated should be
lifted from the shoulders of the plaintiff and that "the burden of presenting evidence of an
informed consent should be on the physician and that burden should not be deemed satis-
fied by the uncorroborated testimony of the physician." Seidelson, 14 Duquesne L Rev at
345 (cited within this note). "Given such a rule of law, it seems fair to conclude that physi-
cians would utilize the opportunity presented by the professional relationship with their
patients to fashion some form of continuing evidence of an informed consent." Id. In the
situation presented in the text, a conclusive presumption seems more appropriate than the
suggestion made in the earlier article for two reasons. First, in the case considered in the
text, defendant would have had no meaningful opportunity to know if the label had in-
formed the victim; thus "shifting" the burden of proof would make little sense. Second, the
duty violated by defendant was one imposed by a criminal statute. This suggests that the
legislature felt strongly about that duty. In these circumstances, the conclusive presumption
seems to me to be the most appropriate judicial reaction.
21. See, for example, FRE 301:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of go-
ing forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which re-
mains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
Id.
[I]f the defendant offers no proof on this question[,] . . .the jury will be instructed
that if they find the existence of the facts as contended by plaintiff, they must find
[consistently with the presumption].
E. W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence 974 (West, 3d ed 1984).
22. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence at 974 (cited in note 21).
[U]nder what is known as the Thayer or "bursting bubble" theory, the only effect of a
presumption is to shift the burden of producing evidence with regard to the pre-
sumed fact. If that evidence is produced by the adversary, the presumption is spent
and disappears.
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permissible inference, and if the defendant presented no evidence
negating cause and effect, the jury would be instructed that, even
if it accepted plaintiff's evidence, the jury would be free to accept
or reject the permissible inference as to factual cause and effect.
2
If the defendant presented evidence negating cause and effect, the
last instruction would be augmented by an instruction that, in
resolving the factual cause and effect relationship, the jury is to
consider the defendant's evidence on this point.
But suppose that when Mr. Osborne entered the bathroom he
had not turned on the light before ingesting the toxic product in
the mistaken belief that it was an antacid. Let's suppose also that
in the unlighted bathroom, it would not have been possible to see a
poison label even if one had been affixed to the product. How
would this affect the court's determination as to the applicability
of the criminal statute to the case? Under these circumstances, the
court would be compelled to rule that there had been no factual
cause and effect relationship between the statutory violation and
the victim's death. Hence, the statute would be inapplicable and,
absent any other theory of liability generated by the plaintiff's evi-
dence, the court would grant defendant's motion for directed
verdict.
In analyzing Osborne and each of the hypothetical spin-offs of
that case, we have been able to determine the applicability of the
criminal statute to the particular case and the consequences of
that determination by asking and answering three questions: was
the victim within the class intended to be protected by the stat-
ute? Was the peril that occasioned the victim's injury one intended
to be protected against by the statute? Was there a factual cause
Id.
23. Id at 965, 966 (footnote omitted). Inferences that a trial judge decides may rea-
sonably be drawn from the evidence need no other description, even though the judge relies
upon precedent or a statute rather than his own experiences in reaching his decision. In
most instances, the application of any other label to an inference will only cause confusion.
Id.
"Permissive" presumptions are those that never require the jury to do anything. A per-
missive presumption merely authorizes the judge to instruct the jury that it "may" infer the
presumed fact if it finds the basic fact. (This is what, in the civil context, we referred to as a
"permissive inference.")
Steven J. Emanuel, Evidence 445 (Emanuel Law Outlines, Inc., 1st ed 1988).
The court ... may mean merely that once B [basic fact] is established (and in the
absence of any direct proof about whether P [presumption] does or does not exist),
the jury may (but need not) conclude that P exists. This is the weakest link between
B and P that is ever contemplated by the term "presumption." More commonly, this
weak link is referred to as a "permissible inference" rather than a presumption.
Emanuel, Evidence at 445 (cited within this note).
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and effect relationship between the statutory violation and the vic-
tim's injury? If all three questions were answered affirmatively, the
statute was applicable. If any one of the three was answered nega-
tively, the statute was inapplicable. In none of the cases was it nec-
essary or even appropriate to make an independent determination
of proximate cause. Intelligent answers to the "who" and "what"
questions complemented by an intelligent answer to the factual
cause and effect question will invariably determine the applicabil-
ity issue without separate consideration of proximate cause. At
best, such separate consideration would be superfluous. At most, it
can be downright confusing.
In Ney v Yellow Cab Co.,24 defendant's employee "permitted
[his] taxicab to remain unattended on a Chicago street without
first stopping the engine or locking the ignition or removing the
key. . . . [A] thief stole the taxicab and while in flight ran into
plaintiff's vehicle causing property damage. '2 5 Illinois law provided
that: "[n]o person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall per-
mit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, lock-
ing the ignition and removing the.key[.]" '26 Plaintiff recovered
damages based on defendant's employee's violation of the statute.
On appeal, defendant argued that the statute was not applicable to
this case. The court began its examination of that issue with this
language:
[T]he issue presented requires our determination of the following ques-
tions: (a) What was the legislative intent? (b) Is the violation of thestatute
the proximate cause of the injury? (c) Is the act of the thief an intervening,
independent, efficient force which breaks the causal connection between the
original wrong and the injury?
2 7
Simply to read these three questions, the last two of which must be
superfluous if the first is answered intelligently, strongly suggests
that the court's opinion will be confusing. The court did not
disappoint.
The court quite properly directed its attention to legislative in-
tent. However, the court did not specifically ask and answer: (1)
Was the plaintiff within the class of persons intended to be pro-
tected by the statute? (2) Was the peril that occasioned the plain-
tiff's injury one from which the statute was intended to protect?
24. 2 IMl 2d 74, 117 NE2d 74 (1954).
25. Ney, 117 NE2d at 76.
26. Ill Rev Stat ch 95-1/2, § 11-1401 (1953).
27. Ney, 117 NE2d at 77.
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(3) Was there a factual cause and effect relationship between de-
fendant's statutory violation and plaintiffs injury? Instead, the
court attempted to determine the legal consequences of the "illegal
or criminal"28 intervening act of the thief on common law grounds.
This led to a long exegesis on the growing use of automobiles,
"[t]he man who once walked a mile now drives a block, '2 9 the inci-
dence of car thefts and injuries therefrom which "frequently
shocks the readers of the daily press,"30 and the growing disregard
for property rights apparently contributed to by "[t]hree major
wars during the lifetime of this generation."3 1 All of this was fol-
lowed by this encomium to the right to trial by jury:
Questions of negligence, due care and proximate cause are ordinarily ques-
tions of fact for a jury to decide. The right of trial by jury is recognized in
the Magna Charta, our Declaration of Independence and both our State and
Federal constitutions. It is a fundamental right in our democratic judicial
system. Questions which are composed of such qualities sufficient to cause
reasonable men to arrive at different results should never be determined as
matters of law. The debatable quality of issues such as negligence and prox-
imate cause, the fact that fair-minded men might reach different conclu-
sions, emphasize the appropriateness and necessity of leaving such ques-
tions to a fact-finding body. The jury is the tribunal under our legal system
to decide that type of issue. To withdraw such questions from the jury is to
usurp its functions. ...
For the foregoing reasons, it is our opinion that the Appellate Court was
correct in affirming the judgment [for the plaintiff] of the municipal court
of Chicago.
32
This can't be right. I bow to no one in my respect and admiration
for the jury system. (I challenge some court to top this cliche.) Ju-
ries regularly demonstrate extraordinary competence and conscien-
tiousness. But the issue before the court in Ney was whether the
criminal statute was applicable to the particular negligence action.
The question of legislative intent is for the court; it cannot ration-
ally be fopped off on a jury.33
Let's attempt to resolve this issue by asking the three relevant
questions: was the plaintiff within the class of persons intended to
be protected by the criminal statute? Was the peril that occa-
sioned his injury one from which the statute was intended to pro-
28. Id.
29. Id at 79.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id at 80.
33. See text at notes 14 and 15.
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tect? Was there a factual cause and effect relationship between
statutory violation and injury? In this instance, the first two ques-
tions, the "who" and the "what" questions, are intimately related.
The plaintiff's injury was a product of a combination of the con-
duct of the inadvertent employee who parked the car and of the
cab thief. Did the legislature, in enacting the statute, intend to
protect users of the roadway from that combination of conduct?
On this question, reasonable courts can and do differ."4 Some, giv-
ing such statutes a relatively restrictive reading, conclude that the
legislative intent was to protect against only accidental starting or
moving of the parked vehicle or, to the extent that the legislature
intended to protect against vehicle theft, it intended to do so only
for the benefit of vehicle owners or law enforcement agencies.3 5
Other courts, giving the statute a relatively broad reading, con-
clude that the legislature intended to deter vehicle theft and to do
so for the benefit of other users of the roadway who may be jeop-
ardized by the negligent driving of the thief.3 " Under this broader
interpretation, the plaintiff in Ney would be within the protected
class and the peril that occasioned his injury would be one against
which the statute was intended to protect. Was there a factual
cause and effect relationship between statutory violation and
plaintiff's injury? Of course; the cabbie's failure to remove the igni-
tion key caused or greatly facilitated the theft of the cab. Once
having so decided, the court would confront no separate proximate
cause issue, much less a proximate cause issue to be fopped off on
a jury. And, once having so decided, the court would instruct the
34. W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser & Keeton on Torts 224-25 (West 5th ed 1984).
"Sometimes the courts have disagreed over a broad and a narrow construction of similar
statutes, as where provisions requiring that parked cars shall be locked and the keys re-
moved have been held to be intended, and not to be intended, for the protection of a person
run down by a thief escaping with a stolen car." Id.
One of the best known of the cases giving such a statute a broad interpretation is Ross v
Hartman, 139 F2d 14 (DC Cir 1943). A narrow interpretation was given in Liberto v
Holfeldt, 221 Md 62, 155 A2d 698 (1959). For a case involving a choice-of-law problem aris-
ing out of the divergent conclusions by the District of Columbia and Maryland courts, see
Gaither u Myers, 404 F2d 216 (DC Cir 1968).
35. See, for example, Gower v Lamb, 282 SW2d 867, 871 (Mo App 1955): "In the case
at bar the defendant's car was not placed in operation by a curious intermeddler, but by a
thief."
"[T]he purpose of the council was largely for the protection of car owners themselves and
as an aid in proper law enforcement in the discouragement of theft and pilferage. It is one
thing to say that the ordinance is designed to prevent thefts and quite another to say that it
is aimed at preventing negligent driving from the scene of the theft." Anderson v Theisen,
231 Minn 369, 43 NW2d 272, 273 (1950).
36. Ross, 139 F2d at 15.
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jury that, if the jury accepted the plaintiff's evidence, the jury
should find for the plaintiff. Should the court embrace the more
restrictive reading of the statute, it would find that the plaintiff
was not within the protected class and the peril that occasioned his
injury was not one from which the statute was intended to protect.
Consequently, the statute would be inapplicable to the case. Once
again, there would be no separate proximate cause issue and cer-
tainly none to be imposed on the jury. Rather, assuming that the
plaintiff's evidence generated no alternative theory of liability, the
court would grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
If the court, employing the broader statutory interpretation,
finds the statute applicable, and if the jury accepts the plaintiff's
evidence, the jury would be instructed to find for the plaintiff. This
doesn't mean, of course, that there may be no further function for
the jury. The court's determination that the statute is applicable
to the action is necessarily based on the plaintiff's evidence which
the jury could accept. But the defendant remains free to present
controverting evidence and the jury remains free to accept this evi-
dence. For example, the defendant could present evidence that the
cabbie had turned off the engine and removed the ignition key
before leaving the cab. The thief stole the cab with no inadvertent
assistance from the cabbie. If the jury accepts this evidence, the
statute would become inapplicable to the case and, assuming that
plaintiff's evidence generated no alternative theory of liability, the
jury would be instructed to disregard the statute and find for the
defendant. This factfinding function is for the jury. Determining
legislative intent, Ney to the contrary notwithstanding, is for the
court. The court should not abdicate its responsibility for deter-
mining the applicability of the statute, accepting the plaintiff's evi-
dence as true as the court must since the jury may, and attempt to
impose that responsibility on the jury. Neither should the court
usurp the jury's function as ultimate factfinder in determining
what evidence to credit. Since the court cannot know whose evi-
dence the jury will accept, the court must instruct the jury on the
applicability and effect of the statute, depending on the jury's ulti-
mate factual conclusions.
In Ney, the court surrendered its obligation and imposed upon
the jury the ultimate judicial responsibility of determining the ap-
plicability of the statute, even accepting the plaintiff's evidence.
This is just the sort of confusion that may occur when a court fails
to appreciate the full legal significance of asking and answering the
three critical questions for determining the applicability of a crimi-
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nal statute to a particular negligence action. If the court errone-
ously believes that there remains a separate proximate cause issue,
the court may out of ill-considered habit lapse into a treatment of
this issue that would be appropriate absent the statute.
Let's tinker with the facts of Ney. Let's assume that plaintiff's
evidence indicates that defendant's employee left the cab parked
at three o'clock in the morning on a public street in a disreputable
part of town where vehicle thefts are common. The cabbie left the
key in the ignition and entered a diner for a cup of coffee and a
doughnut. Fifteen minutes later, while the cabbie was still in the
diner, a thief stole the cab and, in making his getaway, negligently
caused the cab to strike plaintiff's car. Plaintiff sued defendant to
recover for the property damage thus sustained. Plaintiff offers the
criminal statute into evidence. Let's assume that the court, giving
the statute a narrow interpretation, concludes that the statute is
inapplicable to the case. Should the court then grant defendant's
motion for a directed verdict? I think not. Even disregarding the
(inapplicable) statute, but accepting the plaintiff's evidence as
true, a reasonable jury could find: (1) negligence attributable to the
defendant, (2) a legally cognizable injury sustained by the plaintiff,
(3) a factual cause and effect relationship between negligence and
injury, and (4) that the negligence had been a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury. The evidence suggests that a reasonable jury
could find that the cabbie's conduct had been inconsistent with
that of a reasonable person in like circumstances and created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to others. The property dam-
age to plaintiff's car is certainly a legally cognizable injury. A rea-
sonable jury could find that the cabbie's failure to remove the igni-
tion key caused or greatly facilitated the theft; therefore there
existed a factual cause and effect relationship between negligence
and injury. Finally, a reasonable jury could find that such negli-
gence had been a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Given the
environment in which this negligence occurred, a reasonable jury
could conclude that the intervening theft was reasonably foresee-
able, thereby making it reasonably foreseeable that defendant's
negligence would cause injury of some kind to this plaintiff, a user
of the roadway, and that the manner of injury (negligent driving
by the escaping thief) was within the general manner of injury rea-
sonably foreseeable as a result of defendant's negligence. 37
37. For a discussion of when an intervening criminal act may not be superseding, see
Seidelson, 19 Duquesne L Rev at 23 (cited in note 11).
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There is an obvious lesson to be drawn from this spin-off of Ney.
When the court concludes that the criminal statute offered by the
plaintiff is inapplicable to the case, the court should not automati-
cally grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Rather, the
court should determine whether or not plaintiff's evidence gener-
ates a legally sufficient negligence action on wholly common law
grounds. If the evidence does generate such a legally sufficient
case, defendant's motion should of course be denied and the case
submitted to the jury. This spin-off of Ney suggests another, per-
haps less obvious moral. The court found the criminal statute in-
applicable because of the relatively narrow interpretation the court
gave the statute and its underlying legislative intention. Every
time a court is confronted with plaintiff's assertion that a criminal
statute is applicable to a particular negligence action, the court,
bearing the responsibility for determining legislative intent, also
has the inherent capacity to give the statute and the underlying
legislative intent a relatively broad or a relatively narrow reading.
This inherent capacity should overcome any reluctance the court
may have about fulfilling its obligation to determine legislative in-
tent. No litigant, plaintiff or defendant, can force a finding as to
legislative intent on the court. Of course, counsel on both sides can
and should attempt to enlighten and influence the court with re-
gard to the underlying intent. Ultimately, however, it is the court
that must make the determination and, in doing so, the court has
significant room for maneuver in affording the statute and the leg-
islative intent a relatively broad or narrow interpretation, assum-
ing there is no binding precedent. This inherent judicial capacity
should deter any court from throwing its hands up in despair and
imposing the judicial function of determining legislative intent
upon the jury, as the Ney court did.
Let's take another case, one presenting a more sophisticated
problem than Ney. In Orner v Mallick, 8 the minor plaintiff at-
tended three high school graduation parties, at each of which he
was served intoxicating beverages. At the third party, the intoxi-
cated plaintiff "fell over a second floor railing and sustained seri-
ous head injuries." 39 To recover for his injuries, plaintiff sued all
three hosts. The second host demurred to the complaint. At that
point, legal chronology became important. When the trial judge
sustained the defendant's demurrer, the intermediate appellate
38. 515 Pa 132, 527 A2d 521 (1987).
39. Orner, 527 A2d at 522.
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court had refused to impose liability on a social host for injuries
resulting from the serving of intoxicating beverages to a visibly in-
toxicated guest, even a minor.40 Subsequently, the highest appel-
late court reversed that decision,4 holding "that social host liabil-
ity could exist for service of intoxicants to minors. '42 Still, the
intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's sustaining of
defendant's demurrer in Orner, concluding that the case was not
covered by the decision of the highest appellate court.
43
The opinion of the highest appellate court had imposed liability
on the social host who had served alcohol to a minor "to the point
of intoxication. ' 44 In Orner, the plaintiff did not allege that the
second social host had served alcohol to him "to the point of intox-
ication." This was the reason for the intermediate appellate court's
affirmance of the trial court's order sustaining defendant's demur-
rer. The highest .appellate court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, thus
confronting the court with- this issue: may a social host who serves
intoxicating beverages to a minor be held liable for injuries sus-
tained by that minor as a result of his subsequent intoxication
even though the intoxicants served by her did not render the vic-
tim intoxicated?
Resolution of this issue depended on judicial interpretation of
two criminal statutes. One of those statutes made it unlawful for a
minor to ingest intoxicating beverages. 4 5 The second made it un-
lawful to act as an accomplice of another in committing a criminal
offense. 46 In Congini v Portersville Valve Co.,47 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had concluded that, on the basis of those two stat-
utes, minor plaintiff had a legally sufficient case against social host
defendant, which had served intoxicants to the minor to the point
of intoxication, for injuries sustained by the minor in a collision.
Although Congini recognized such liability, the opinion contained
this language:
40. Congini v Portersville Valve Co., 312.Pa Super 461, 458 A2d 1384 (1983), rev'd,
504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515.
41. Congini v Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983), rev'g 312 Pa
Super 461, 458 A2d 1384 (1983).
42. Orner, 527 A2d at 522.
43. Id. "Nevertheless, the superior court affirmed the order of the lower court in this
case, finding that even under our decision in Congini ... Mr. Orner had failed to state a
cause of action against Ms. Bonsall." Id.
44. Congini, 470 A2d at 518.
45. 18 Pa Cons Stat § 6308 (Purdon 1983) (amended 1988 in a manner not relevant
to use in this text).
46. 18 Pa Cons Stat § 306(b)(3)(c)(1)(ii) (Purdon 1983).
47. 504 Pa 157, 470 A2d 515 (1983).
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[W]e find that defendant [I [was] negligent per se in serving alcohol to the
point of intoxication to a person less than twenty-one years of age, and that
it can be held liable for injuries proximately resulting from the minor's
intoxication. 8
That language was immediately followed by this footnote:
A finding of negligence per se does no more than satisfy plaintiff's burden
of establishing that a defendant's conduct was negligent. . . . However, the
burden remains upon plaintiff to establish that his complained of injuries
were proximately caused by the statutory violations.
4 9
Well, here we go again. Another court apparently concluded that a
criminal statute was applicable to the negligence action before the
court, but that proximate cause was a separate issue. In Congini,
the appellate court was able to walk away from this conclusion by
remanding the case to the trial court "for proceeding not inconsis-
tent with our opinion."5 But this kind of confusion doesn't just
disappear; it came back to haunt the appellate court in Orner.
In Orner, the second social host challenged the legal sufficiency
of the minor plaintiff's complaint, absent an allegation that the in-
toxicants served by her had caused his intoxication. The appellate
court concluded that the statutory violation, and therefore defend-
ant's negligence, "occur[red] with the service of any alcohol to a
minor, not just an amount sufficient to intoxicate the minor."'" But
then the court added:
We readily acknowledge that the question of whether an adult defendant
is responsible for a minor's intoxica tion is a relevant one. However, it is a
question which goes to the issue of causation, not to the question of whether
a defendant had a duty and/or breached a duty to the plaintiff.
5
2
To "corroborate" this conclusion, the court cited to Congini where
"we emphasized that the mere breach of a duty does not mandate
a finding of liability, for the plaintiff still bears the burden of prov-
ing that the breach resulted in his injury. ' 53 Reversing the order of
the intermediate appellate court, which had affirmed the sus-
taining of defendant's demurrer, the highest appellate court re-
manded the case to the trial court "for proceeding consistent with
this opinion.
'54
48. Congini, 470 A2d at 518 (footnotes omitted).
49. Id at 518 n.4.
50. Id at 519.
51. Orner, 527 A2d at 524.
52. Id (footnote omitted).
53. Id at 524 n.2.
54. Id at 524.
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The dissent in Orner wasn't having any. It had its own view of
the legal significance of the statutory violations:
Today the majority suggests that there is no requirement of a nexus be-
tween the amount consumed as a result of the furnishing by the social host
who is sought to be held liable and the subsequent injury. Under this theory
one who permits a twenty-year old person to have a tablespoonful of an
intoxicating substance would be responsible for any further conduct without
any demonstration that that conduct was influenced by the consumption of
the substance provided by the host. To me this is an unreasonable position
and I therefore register my dissent.55
But wait a minute. The majority didn't suggest that. Rather, the
majority sought to limit the significance of the statutory violation
to negligence, treating causation (and, I think, proximate cause) as
separate issues. How would the dissent have resolved this matter
of causation? "I would not. . . adopt the term 'intoxication' as the
test.. . . It is sufficient in my judgment to find liability if there is
any degree of impairment that can be found to have occasioned
[the minor's] subsequent imbibing which resulted in this tragic in-
jury. '58 And this language is immediately followed by this
footnote:
Again I remind the majority.., where the duty is defined by statute the
court is not permitted to apply rules of foreseeability and causation based
upon judicial policy, but rather must strictly track the legislative intent in
creating the duty in the first instance.5"
I think this language in the footnote is precisely correct. I also
think, however, that it is inconsistent with the text of the dissent
which would condition "liability" on a finding of "impairment" re-
sulting from the intoxicants served by the host. The dissent would
have "remand[ed] the matter to the trial court giving the plaintiff
an opportunity to amend his pleading to accord with the require-
ments herein set forth, '5 8 presumably intending that the plaintiff's
complaint would have added to it an allegation that the intoxicants
served by the second host had "impaired" the minor plaintiff.
Somehow, both the majority and the dissent seem to have lost
track of the significance of a legal determination that a criminal
statute is applicable to a particular negligence action.
Let's attempt our own analysis of Orner. The first of the two
criminal statutes provides in part: "A person commits a summary
55. Id.
56. Id at 525 (footnote omitted).
57. Id at 525 n.2.
58. Id at 525.
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offense if he, being less than 21 years of age, . . . consumes ...
any liquor or malt or brewed beverages." 9 The second reads in
part:
A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when. . he is
an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.. . . A
person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if
... with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the of-
fense, he ... aids ... such other person in . . . committing it. .6o
Should the combination of these two statutes be deemed applica-
ble to Orner? Given the obvious generality of the accomplice stat-
ute, a reasonable court might very well answer that question nega-
tively. Since the accomplice statute makes no specific reference to
the act of providing intoxicants to a minor, the court might well
conclude that the statute evidences no legislative intent whatso-
ever with regard to the civil liability of one who so provides intoxi-
cants. This relatively narrow reading of the accomplice statute
would lead the court to conclude that the minor plaintiff was not
within the class intended to be protected by the statute and that
the peril that occasioned his injury was not one from which the
statute was intended to protect. Consequently, the court would
conclude that the two statutes taken together were not applicable
to the action.
Before sustaining (or affirming the sustaining of) the defendant's
demurrer, however, the court should determine whether the well-
pleaded facts in the complaint generate a legally sufficient case
wholly apart from the statute. Absent an allegation that the intoxi-
cants served by the second host caused or contributed to the minor
plaintiff's intoxication and injury, the answer would be no. In these
circumstances, the complaint would be inadequate to allege a le-
gally sufficient common law cause of action. But, emulating the
dissent, let's afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the com-
plaint to allege that the intoxicants served him by the defendant
did cause or contribute to the plaintiff's intoxication and injury.
This, I think, would constitute a legally sufficient assertion of a
common law negligence action. Let's assume the trial court would
agree and that the case proceeds to trial. At trial, plaintiff presents
evidence consistent with the allegations in his amended complaint.
At the close of plaintiff's case in chief, defendant moves for a non-
59. 18 Pa Cons Stat § 6308 (Purdon 1983) (amended 1988 in a manner not relevant
to use in this text).
60. 18 Pa Cons Stat § 306(b)(3)(c)(1)(ii) (Purdon 1983).
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suit. How should the court rule?
From the evidence presented, could a reasonable jury find that
the conduct of the defendant, the second social host, was inconsis-
tent with the conduct of a reasonable person in like circumstances
and created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to another? I
think the answer is yes. A reasonable jury could find' that serving
intoxicants to a minor created a reasonably foreseeable risk of in-
jury to the minor or to others, even though the intoxicants served
did not themselves produce intoxication. A reasonable jury could
find that a reasonable person in defendant's circumstances would
have recognized that serving intoxicants to a minor could result in
an enhanced likelihood that the minor would subsequently ingest
additional intoxicants, become intoxicated, and thereby create a
risk of injury to himself or to others. That a reasonable jury could
so find is suggested even more strongly by the specific facts of the
case. " [The minor had been a] guest at a series of high school
graduation parties which took place during the night of June 12,
1981, and the early morning hours of June 13, 1981.. . . [At the
first party, the minor] was allegedly served intoxicating bever-
ages."61 Obviously, the "serious head injuries ' 62 sustained by the
plaintiff constituted a legally cognizable injury. Could a reasonable
jury find a factual cause and effect relationship between the second
host's negligence and plaintiff's injury? Again, I think the answer
is yes. From the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could con-
clude that the intoxicants served by the defendant, while not alone
causing the minor's intoxication, contributed to the minor's subse-
quent ingestion of more intoxicants and therefore to his ultimate
intoxication, the cause of his injuries. Could a reasonable jury find
that the second host's negligence had been a proximate cause of
the minor's injury? I think a reasonable jury could find that the
second host's negligence created a reasonably foreseeable risk of
injury of some kind to this plaintiff and that the manner of injury
that occurred, the minor's intoxication causing him to "f[a]ll over a
second floor railing, 61 3 was within the general manner of injury
reasonably foreseeable as a result of the second host's negligence.
It would appear that the plaintiff's evidence generated a legally
sufficient common law negligence action and thus defendant's mo-
tion for nonsuit should be denied.





There is, however, one further problem to be considered. Should
the jury, as a condition precedent to finding for the plaintiff, be
required to find that the intoxicants served him by the second host
directly contributed to the minor's intoxication or only that the
intoxicants served by the second host impaired the minor's judg-
ment and thereby led him to ingest additional intoxicants that oc-
casioned his intoxication? This is the problem that separated the
majority and dissent in Orner. As we shall note subsequently, this
distinction may have been wholly spurious in the actual case where
liability was asserted on the basis of the two criminal statutes. It
may, however, have some legitimacy in this spin-off of Orner where
the court, having concluded that the statutes are inapplicable,
must determine legal sufficiency and, ultimately, appropriate jury
instructions, based wholly on common law. To focus as precisely as
possible on the distinction, let's assume that from the evidence
presented by the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find either that
the intoxicants served by the second host directly contributed to
the minor's ultimate intoxication or merely that those intoxicants
impaired the minor's judgment and thereby led him to ingest addi-
tional intoxicants at the third party that caused his intoxication.
In order to satisfy the factual cause and effect relationship be-
tween the negligence of the second host and the injuries sustained
by the minor plaintiff, which finding should the jury be required to
make? Obviously, the court must answer that question in deter-
mining the proper instructions to give the jury.
To me, the question is a fairly easy one. If the jury finds that the
intoxicants served by the second host impaired the minor's judg-
ment and thereby led him to consume additional intoxicants that
caused his intoxication, the jury should be free to conclude that
there existed a factual cause and effect relationship between the
second host's negligence and the plaintiff's injuries. This jury find-
ing does indeed encompass a factual cause and effect relationship;
impaired judgment leading to the consumption of the ultimately
intoxicating beverages does not break the chain of factual cause
and effect between the second host's conduct and the minor's inju-
ries. Therefore, it should be deemed adequate to satisfy this legally
essential element of the plaintiff's common law action. Moreover,
treating such a jury finding as sufficient to satisfy the factual cause
and' effect relationship spares the jury the task of drawing what
may be a nearly metaphysical distinction and avoids affording the
culpable defendant a litigation reward if the jury draws that ab-
struse distinction in a particular manner. Consequently, the evi-
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dence presented by the plaintiff would generate a legally sufficient
common law case of negligence. The jury, considering the plain-
tiff's evidence and the defendant's evidence and properly in-
structed by the court, would then be required to make factual de-
terminations with regard to each element of the case: negligence
attributable to the defendant, a legally cognizable injury sustained
by the plaintiff, a factual cause and effect relationship between
such negligence and that injury, and whether such negligence had
been a proximate cause of that injury. In this common law action,
each of these factors is entirely appropriate for factual determina-
tion by the jury. In Orner, where the court concluded that the two
statutes were applicable, both the majority and dissent apparently
would permit unfettered jury determinations as to each of these
elements except negligence. This, I think, reflects a certain judicial
confusion as to the legal significance of a finding that a criminal
statute is applicable to a particular negligence action.64
64. Given the apparent conclusions of both the majority and the dissent in Orner
that the jury should determine each of these elements except negligence, perhaps the court
should have concluded, as we did hypothetically, that the statutes did not give rise to a
cause of action. Rather, plaintiff's cause rested entirely on common law principles. Then
jury consideration of each of these elements would be entirely appropriate. Of course, in
Orner the court was confronted with its own earlier determination in Congini that the cause
of action did arise out of the criminal statutes. Was that conclusion in Congini necessary?
To a significant extent, that conclusion in Congini resulted from the court's effort to distin-
guish Congini from Klein v Raysinger, 504 Pa 141, 470 A2d 507 (1983), in which the court
refused to impose common law liability on a social host who had served intoxicants to an
adult guest beyond intoxication, even though the host knew that the guest would be driving,
for injuries sustained by victims of the guest's drunken driving. The court distinguished
Congini from Klein in this manner:
In Klein... we held that there exists no common law liability on the part of a social
host for the service of intoxicants to his adult guests. In arriving at this decision we
relied upon the common law rule that in the case of an ordinary able bodied man, it
is the consumption of alcohol rather than the furnishing thereof, that is the proxi-
mate cause of any subsequent damage.
However, our legislature has made a legislative judgment that persons under
twenty-one years of age are incompetent to handle alcohol. Under Section 6308 of the
Crimes Code,. . . a person "less than 21 years of age" commits a summary offense if
he "attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or transports any alcohol,
liquor or malt or brewed beverages." Furthermore, under Section 306 of the Crimes
Code ... an adult who furnishes liquor to a minor would be liable as an accomplice
to the same extent as the offending minor.
This legislative judgment compels a different result than Klein, for here we are not
dealing with ordinary able bodied men. Rather, we are confronted with persons who
are, at least in the eyes of the law, incompetent to handle the affects [sic] of alcohol.
Congini, 470 A2d at 517 (footnote omitted).
Thus the court distinguished Congini from Klein in two respects: (1) in Congini the guest
had been a minor and (2) therefore the two criminal statutes applied. But was this second
distinction legally necessary? I think not. In our hypothetical treatment in the text, based
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Let's attempt our own analysis of Orner, accepting the court's
conclusion (apparently shared by majority and dissent) that the
combination of the two statutes is applicable to the action. This
conclusion must mean that the minor plaintiff is within the class
intended to be protected by the statutes and that the peril that
occasioned his injuries is one intended to be protected against by
the statutes. Stated more specifically, this conclusion must mean
that the minor plaintiff as one under twenty-one years of age is
within the class intended to be protected by the statutes and that
the peril that occasioned his injuries, his intoxication, is one in-
tended to be protected against by the statutes.
Was there a factual cause and effect relationship between the
second host's violation of the accomplice statute and the minor's
injuries? I think that in determining that the peril that occasioned
the minor's injuries, his intoxication, was one intended to be pro-
tected against by the statutes, we have already answered the fac-
tual cause and effect question affirmatively. It would be anomalous
to conclude that the minor's intoxication, the peril that occasioned
his injuries, was one intended to be protected against by the stat-
utes, but that the second host's violation of the accomplice statute,
serving intoxicants to the minor, was not a factual cause of the
minor's injuries. Let's attempt to prove this conclusion.
The first statute makes it unlawful for a minor to consume any
amount of intoxicating beverages. The second statute makes it un-
lawful to provide any amount of intoxicating beverages to a minor.
Why? The underlying legislative rationale must be that a minor,
lacking the mature judgment of an adult, once provided and hav-
ing consumed any amount of an intoxicating beverage will be likely
on the assumption that the statutes were inapplicable, we concluded that the host's serving
of intoxicants to a minor did create a legally sufficient common law case with regard to
injuries resulting from the minor's subsequent intoxication.
The court in Congini could have arrived at the very same conclusion, distinguishing Klein
only on the ground that the guest in Congini had been a minor, not "an able bodied man."
The court could have used the first statute, making it unlawful for a minor to acquire or
consume intoxicants, for the limited purpose of corroborating its conclusion that a minor is
not competent to handle the effects of alcohol. In this manner, the court in Congini could
have approved of the imposition of common law liability on the guest who serves intoxicants
to a minor, thereby preserving all of the jury functions appropriate to such a common law
negligence action. Then in Orner, the court could have followed the same pattern with the
same preservation of all the jury functions associated with a purely common law negligence
action. What the court cannot do, logically and rationally, is find the two criminal statutes
applicable to both cases and still reserve to the jury all those functions appropriate to a
common law action. This awkward amalgam of legislative intent and common law concepts
frustrates the former to placate an overblown view of the latter.
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to consume sufficient additional intoxicating beverages to become
intoxicated and be a threat to his own well-being and the well-
being of others. Therefore, the legislature, in enacting the two stat-
utes, intended to preclude the minor from ingesting any amount of
intoxicating beverages because of the likelihood that any such in-
gestion would produce ultimate intoxication and peril to the minor
and others. Given this legislative intent, the second host's provid-
ing any amount of an intoxicant to the minor must be considered a
factual cause of the minor's ultimate intoxication and intoxication-
caused injuries. Consequently, once concluding from the plaintiff's
pleadings or evidence, (depending on the stage of the case) that
the two statutes are applicable to the action, the court must con-
clude that there was a factual cause and effect relationship be-
tween the second host's violation of the accomplice statute and the
minor's injuries. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with
the legislative intent underlying the two statutes.
Let's assume that at trial plaintiff presents evidence of the facts
set forth in the court's opinion. During the course of the night and
early morning hours, minor plaintiff attended three graduation
parties. He was served intoxicating beverages at all three. At the
third party, his intoxicated condition caused him to "f[a]ll over a
second floor railing and sustain[] serious head injuries." 5 Ac-
cepting the court's conclusion that the two statutes apply to the
action, plaintiff would be entitled to a jury instruction to the effect
that, if the jury accepts the plaintiff's evidence, the jury must find
for the plaintiff. This instruction would not require the jury to
make a separate finding that the intoxicants served by the second
host had directly caused the minor's intoxication or had impaired
the minor's judgment leading him to consume additional beverages
that caused his intoxication. The legislature has already deter-
mined that serving intoxicants to a minor will so impair his judg-
ment. To require a separate jury finding on this point would be to
ignore this aspect of legislative intent.
There is, of course, a factual situation, apparently not involved
in Orner, where such a jury determination would be appropriate. If
from the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could find that the
impairing effect of the intoxicants served the minor by the second
host had completely disappeared before the minor consumed the
additional beverages that directly caused his intoxication, the jury
should be required to determine this issue. If the jury finds that
65. Orner, 527 A2d at 522.
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the impairing effect had so disappeared, liability under the stat-
utes would be inappropriate. If, for example, there had been a time
lapse of some hours between the second host's violation of the ac-
complice statute and the minor's ingestion of the additional bever-
ages that directly caused his intoxication, and the jury finds factu-
ally that during the time lapse the impairing effect caused by the
second host's conduct had entirely disappeared, there would be no
factual cause and effect relationship between second host's statu-
tory violation and minor's injuries. In a case where such a factual
conclusion would be reasonable, the dissent's requirement of a
finding of impairment would be entirely appropriate.
This, in turn, raises the question: who should bear the burden of
proof and the ultimate burden of persuasion as to whether the in-
toxicants served by the particular defendant impaired the judg-
ment of the minor, thus contributing to his ultimate intoxication?
Given the already noted apparent legislative determination that
any amount of intoxicating beverage will impair the judgment of a
minor and thus make him susceptible to subsequent ingestion of
intoxicants and ultimate intoxication, it would seem appropriate to
impose upon the defendant the burden of eliciting evidence, either
in the course of cross-examining the plaintiff and his witnesses or
in the presentation of the defense case, that the impairing effect of
the intoxicants served by the defendant had terminated prior to
the minor's subsequent ingestion of intoxicating beverages and ul-
timate intoxication. For the same reason, it would appear appro-
priate to impose upon the defendant the ultimate burden of per-
suasion as to this point. The imposition of these dual burdens
upon the defendant seems most consistent with the apparent legis-
lative determination and intent, and best calculated to effect the
legislative goal: deterring hosts from serving any intoxicants to
minors.
There is another problem lurking in Orner, one not addressed by
the majority or dissenting opinion. Let's assume, as suggested by
both opinions, that the evidence indicates that the second host's
serving of intoxicants to the minor plaintiff impaired his judgment
to the point of leading him to consume additional intoxicants at
the third party, ultimately resulting in his intoxication and inju-
ries. We have already noted that if the jury accepts this evidence,
the jury's verdict should be for the plaintiff and against the second
host defendant. But suppose that the defendant requests the court
to instruct the jury on the minor plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence, such instruction to be complemented by the criminal statute
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making it unlawful for a minor to consume any intoxicating bever-
age and by the state's comparative negligence statute.66 Should the
court grant defendant's request?
Ordinarily, of course, the negligent defendant, even one whose
negligence arises out of his violation of an applicable criminal stat-
ute, is entitled to a comparative negligence defense. In this in-
stance, the defendant presumably would argue there is an a fortiori
reason for permitting that defense: the minor's conduct was in vio-
lation of an applicable criminal statute. Is the statute prohibiting a
minor from consuming any alcoholic beverage applicable to this
case? We can ask the three critical questions with only minor vari-
ations reflecting the fact that the statute is being offered to
demonstrate contributory negligence. Was the minor plaintiff
within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute,
in the sense of self-protective care? The answer would seem to be
yes. The very fact of his minority would place him within the class.
Was the peril that occasioned the minor plaintiff's injury one the
statute was intended to protect against, in the sense of self-protec-
tive care? Again the answer would seem to be yes. The evidence
indicates that the impaired judgment of the minor led to his subse-
quent ingestion of intoxicants, his intoxication, and his injuries.
Was there a factual cause and effect relationship between the mi-
nor's violation of the statute and his injuries? Given the evidence
indicated, clearly a factual relationship existed. Thus, the statute
would appear to be applicable to the case and the minor's violation
contributory negligence, indeed contributory negligence per se.
Therefore, defendant would request that the court instruct the
jury that if the jury accepts the evidence, it must find the plaintiff
contributorily negligent and, through application of the compara-
tive negligence statute, either reduce the damages accordingly or
find for the defendant.e7 Should the court so instruct the jury?
66. 42 Pa Cons Stat § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982).
In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where
such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or de-
fendants against whom recovery is sought, but damages sustained by the plaintiff
shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the
plaintiff.
Id.
67. Under the comparative negligence statute, the plaintiff can recover nothing if his
contributory negligence was "greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defend-
ants against whom recovery is sought." See note 66.
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I think the appropriate answer is no. In our earlier determina-
tions that the two criminal statutes were applicable to the case, we
concluded not only that the minor plaintiff was a member of the
class intended to be protected but that the legislative intent had
been to protect that class of minors even from its own inability to
exercise self-protective care. This is why the legislature made it
unlawful to provide any amount of intoxicating beverage to a mi-
nor. The legislature recognized that any amount of intoxicants
would impair the judgment of one lacking the maturity of an adult.
Because the legislature intended to protect the class even from its
own inability to exercise self-protective care, it would be inconsis-
tent with this legislative intent to permit the defendant either to
diminish the amount of damages or to avoid liability entirely
through a finding of contributory negligence.68
Indeed, both the intermediate appellate court and the highest
appellate court of the state had arrived at just this conclusion in
analogous cases. In Schelin v Goldberg,e9 the defendant, a bar
owner, served intoxicating beverages to an already visibly intoxi-
cated patron who was subsequently injured as a result of his intox-
ication. Liability was imposed upon the defendant because of his
violation of a criminal statute prohibiting licensees from providing
intoxicants to visibly intoxicated patrons.7 0 The trial court then
granted defendant's motion for a new trial, concluding that it had
erred in failing to charge the jury with regard to the patron's con-
tributory negligence. The intermediate appellate court reversed the
order granting the defendant a new trial, finding that the class in-
68. In Zerby u Warren, 297 Minn 134, 210 NW2d 58 (1973), defendant, in violation
of a "glue-sniffing" statute, sold two pints of glue to a thirteen-year-old who, with his four-
teen-year-old friend, sniffed the glue. Because of the injurious effects on the latter's central
nervous system, he fell into a creek and drowned. In the ensuing wrongful death action, the
defendant alleged that the decedent's conduct, also in violation of a criminal statute, consti-
tuted contributory negligence; therefore, defendant asserted the state's comparative negli-
gence statute. The court, finding that the minor had been a member of a class unable to
exercise self-protective care, disallowed the comparative negligence defense. But compare
Spragg v Shuster, 398 NW2d 683 (Minn Ct App 1987), where, in a dramshop action against
defendant, the court concluded that the minor plaintiff would be barred from recovery if
guilty of "complicity." Spragg, 398 NW2d at 686. "The doctrine of complicity holds that
one who provides liquor for another, whose intoxication then causes the provider's injuries,
cannot recover damages from the liquor vendor." Id. The court reversed a summary judg-
ment for defendant, finding that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the minor plaintiff had provided beer for the minor driver whose conduct caused the plain-
tiff's injuries.
69. 188 Pa Super 341, 146 A2d 648 (1958).
70. 47 Pa Stat Ann § 4-493(1) (Purdon 1969) (amended 1987 in a manner not rele-
vant to use in this text).-
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tended to be protected by the criminal statute, visibly intoxicated
patrons, was unable to exercise self-protective care and that the
statute had been intended to protect members of that class from
this very inability. 1 In Majors v Brodhead Hotel,7 2 the supreme
court, confronted with a defendant's violation of the same criminal
statute and a similar effort to invoke the patron's contributory
negligence, concluded that such a defense was not available. 3
But then a funny thing happened. In Congini, the foundation
upon which Orner rests, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after
concluding that a social host who provides intoxicants to a minor
may be held liable for injuries sustained by the intoxicated minor
pursuant to the two criminal statutes found applicable in Orner,
wrote:
Thus, although we recognize that an eighteen year old minor may state a
cause of action against an adult social host who has knowingly served him
intoxicants, the social host in turn may assert as a defense the minor's "con-
tributory" negligence. Thereafter, under our Comparative Negligence Act
... it will remain for the fact finder to resolve whether the defendant's
negligence, was such as to allow recovery. 4
It's obvious from the court's opinion in Congini that the (poten-
tial) liability of the social host was not the result of the application
of common law:
In [1983] . . . we held that there exists no common law liability on the
part of a social host for the service of intoxicants to his adult guests. In
arriving at this decision we relied upon the common law rule that in the
case of an ordinary able bodied man, it is the consumption of alcohol rather
than the furnishing thereof, that is the proximate cause of any subsequent
damage.
75
Rather, the liability considered in Congini was that arising from
the two criminal statutes found applicable to the case by the court:
the first making it unlawful for a minor to consume any intoxicat-
ing beverage and the second making any adult who furnishes in-
toxicants to a minor an accomplice. "This legislative judgment
71. "[T]he Liquor Code. . , making it unlawful to sell.., liquor to any person
visibly intoxicated was enacted to protect society generally, but to protect specifically intox-
icated persons 'from their inability to exercise self-protective care.'" Schelin, 146 A2d at
652, quoting in part from Restatement of Torts § 483 (1934).
72. 416 Pa 265, 205 A2d 873 (1965).
73. Majors, 205 A2d at 876. "The statute was intended to protect persons when they
are visibly intoxicated regardless of how they got that way. Accordingly, the trial judge was
correct in not instructing the jury on contributory negligence." Id.
74. Congini, 470 A2d at 518-19 (footnote omitted).
75. Id at 517.
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compels a different result than [the one we achieved in 1983]...,
for here we are not dealing with ordinary able bodied men. Rather,
we are confronted with persons who are, at least in the eyes of the
law, incompetent to handle the affects [sic] of alcohol. '17  Then
why did the court in Congini resurrect the contributory negligence
defense explicitly rejected in Schelin and Majors?
The only potentially relevant difference in Pennsylvania law be-
tween the repudiation of the contributory negligence defense in
Schelin and Majors and its resurrection in Congini was the enact-
ment of a comparative negligence statute.77 Does that legislative
decision justify recognition of contributory negligence in Congini
and, by extension, in Orner? I think the answer is no. The basic
reason for the enactment of a comparative negligence statute is to
ameliorate the harshness of the common law rule that any degree
of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff will preclude
any recovery from the negligent defendant.7 8 1 do not think it was
the legislative purpose in enacting a comparative negligence stat-
ute to create a contributory negligence defense where no such de-
fense existed prior to the enactment.7 9 1 can understand the "equi-
table" appeal of concluding judicially in Congini and Orner that if
the defendant's violation of criminal statutes aimed at protecting
against the consumption of intoxicants by minors can lead to the
imposition of liability on the defendant, the minor's violation of
one of those statutes having that very same purpose should lead to
a diminished recovery or no recovery at all, depending on the de-
gree of the minor's contributory negligence. But I think that equi-
table appeal should be subordinated to a judicial desire to effectu-
76. Id.
77. See note 66.
78. Keeton, ed, Prosser & Keeton on Torts 468-69 (cited in note 34).
The hardship of the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is readily
apparent. It places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by
hypothesis, responsible. The negligence of the defendant has played no less a part in
causing the damage; the plaintiff's deviation from the community standard of con-
duct may even be relatively slight, and the defendant's quite extreme. The injured
person is in all probability, for the very reason of his injury, the less able of the two
to bear the financial burden of his loss, and the answer of the law to all of this [ab-
sent a comparative negligence rule] is that the defendant goes scot free of all liability,
and the plaintiff bears it all.
Id.
79. Ironically, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania arrived at this same conclusion
with regard to product liability actions, "[n]otwithstanding the consensus emerging among
the courts of other jurisdictions on the use of comparative negligence in strict liability suits
S.. " Staymates v ITT Holub Indus., 364 Pa Super 37, 527 A2d 140, 146 (1987).
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ate the legislative intent.80 We have already noted that the
underlying legislative conclusion is that minors lack the mature
judgment necessary to make the consumption of any amount of
alcoholic beverage acceptable. The legislature apparently has rec-
ognized that, with regard to intoxicants, minors constitute a class
unable to exercise self-protective care. The enactment of a compar-
ative negligence statute does nothing in fact or in law to under-
mine or alter that legislative recognition. Even after the enactment
of the comparative negligence statute, the legislature continues to
view minors as comprising a class of persons unable to exercise
self-protective care after the ingestion of any amount of intoxicat-
ing beverage.81 It is this legislative view that provides the founda-
tion for Congini and Orner. To apply the comparative negligence
statute to those cases vitiates this legislative view.
Then why does the legislature criminalize the minor's ingestion
of intoxicants? Presumably, in the hope that such a criminal stat-
ute will deter minors from consuming intoxicants. Then would not
the application of the comparative negligence statute, diminishing
or eliminating any recovery the minor might enjoy, complement
that policy of deterrence? I think not. I believe that subjecting the
host to undiminished liability for serving intoxicants to a minor is
the more efficient way of accomplishing the deterrent effect. The
social host, not laboring under the minor's lack of mature judg-
ment, is more likely to be sensitive to potential civil litigation con-
sequences in deciding whether or not to serve intoxicants to a mi-
nor. Consequently, a judicial conclusion that the comparative
negligence statute is inapplicable to cases like Congini and Orner
seems more likely to achieve the desired legislative goal than does
the application of comparative negligence.8 2 Ultimately, then, I
think the court in Congini erred in concluding that the compara-
tive negligence statute should be applied and that Orner, to the
extent that it permits the same result, is in error.
This conclusion may be corroborated by a potential pragmatic
consequence generated by Congini and Orner. The minor plaintiff,
80. Compare Zerby v Warren, discussed in note 68.
81. In Congini, the court seems to have failed to recognize the inconsistency between
its application of comparative negligence and its own language describing the legislative
view of minors and alcohol: "[we are confronted with persons who are, at least in the eyes
of the law, incompetent to handle the affects [sic] of alcohol." Congini, 470 A2d at 517.
82. See Zerby v Warren, discussed in note 68. "If [the comparative negligence de-
fense] were permitted, the evident purpose of such statutes would be defeated. Conse-
quently, the legislature must have intended that no defense would displace the responsibil-
ity imposed by the statute." Zerby, 210 NW2d at 62.
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eager to avoid a significantly diminished recovery or no recovery at
all, may be motivated to testify that, although the intoxicants
served him by the second host did impair his judgment, that im-
paired judgment did not result in subsequent intoxication. This
testimony, if credited, might indeed suggest that the minor had
not been contributorily negligent. After all, the peril to be pro-
tected against by the statute prohibiting a minor from consuming
any intoxicants is impaired judgment leading to the consumption
of additional intoxicants and ultimate intoxication. If the minor
never became intoxicated, he may indeed have been free of con-
tributory negligence. But that conclusion, in turn, suggests an-
other. If the minor's impaired judgment did not result in his subse-
quent intoxication, then the peril to be protected against by the
accomplice statute applicable to the second host never eventuated.
Bear in mind that we have concluded that the accomplice statute,
too, was intended to protect against the peril of the minor's im-
paired judgment leading to his subsequent intoxication and ulti-
mate injuries. If the minor's testimony that he never became intox-
icated is credited, it follows that the peril that occasioned his
injuries was not one intended to be protected against by the ac-
complice statute. This means the accomplice statute would be in-
applicable to the case and the second host's motion for nonsuit or
directed verdict would be granted, since no analogous common law
liability is to be imposed."' There is something intuitively discom-
fiting about a situation in which the minor's effort to exculpate
himself from contributory negligence simultaneously exculpates
the second host from any liability. This discomfiture would be a
product of the Congini and Orner conclusion that the host may
invoke the comparative negligence defense.
CONCLUSION
When a court hearing a negligence action is confronted with evi-
dence of violation of a criminal statute, the court must determine
if that statute is applicable to the case before the court. To make
this determination, the court should ask and answer these three
83. This seems to be precisely what happened at trial in Orner after the decision of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The minor plaintiff's claim against the hotel where he
was injured was settled before trial. At trial against the two social hosts, the minor plaintiff
testified that he had not become intoxicated. At the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, the
court granted the motions of the defendants for nonsuit. A motion to strike the nonsuits was
filed and is pending. Telephone conversation with Avram Adler, plaintiff's counsel, (Oct 2,
1990).
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questions: (1) was the victim within the class of persons intended
to be protected by the statute? (2) Was the peril that occasioned
the victim's injury one from which the statute was intended to pro-
tect? (3) Was there a factual cause and effect relationship between
the statutory violation and the victim's injury? If the court an-
swers all three questions affirmatively, the court will have deter-
mined that the statute is applicable to the action. Once this deter-
mination is made, there is no separate issue of proximate cause to
be resolved; affirmative answers to the three questions compel an
affirmative answer to proximate cause. If the jury accepts the evi-
dence that led the court to answer the three questions affirma-
tively, thus determining that the statute was applicable, the jury
must find for the victim of the statutory violation.
In answering the three questions, the court should be sensitive
to and guided by the legislative intent underlying the criminal
statute. The court should not abdicate its judicial responsibility for
determining legislative intent and attempt to impose any part of
that function upon the jury. Nor should the court improperly com-
mingle common law concepts with the underlying legislative intent,
creating spurious issues of proximate cause or factual cause and
effect, where the underlying legislative purpose and intent point to
the resolution of these issues. And, in determining the availability
of a contributory or comparative negligence defense, the court
should determine if the class intended to be protected by the stat-
ute was, in the legislative view, one unable to exercise self-protec-
tive care so that the legislative intent would have been to preclude
such a defense. If the court follows those precepts, its determina-
tions of the applicability of the criminal statute to the action
before the court, the consequences of such applicability, and the
availability of the defense of contributory or comparative negli-
gence are likely to represent an accurate reflection of the underly-
ing legislative intent. And this, after all, should be the goal of every
court in such circumstances.
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